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Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution and the Enlightenment 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), ISBN: 978-0-8166-9949-0. 
As a “philosopher-journalist” for Corriere della Sera Michel Foucault witnessed and cov-
ered events in Iran in the fall of 1978 as the protests against the Pahlavi-regime were 
reaching their highpoint. He was impressed by what he saw on the streets of Tehran and 
supported the cause of the revolting masses in a number of articles and interviews. At 
the time, Foucault’s positive appreciation of the religiously marked movement led by 
Ayatollah Khomeini caused controversy in France.1 Later on, his writings have often 
been dismissed as a display of “infantile leftism”2 or, at least, as a serious error of judg-
ment. There are, nevertheless, also more sympathetic readings arguing that even if Fou-
cault’s account suffered from his limited knowledge about Iran and Shi’i Islam, he can-
not be condemned for having admired the courage of people revolting against a despic-
able regime.3 On the whole, however, Foucault scholars usually just ignore his writings 
on Iran because they are presumed to be theoretically insignificant and of little conse-
quence for the development of his later thinking. In his Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolu-
tion after the Enlightenment Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests otherwise. Evoking Susan 
Buck-Morss’ ”Hegel and Haiti”, he argues that even if never acknowledged, it was more 
than anything else the encounter with the revolutionary movement in Iran that made 
Foucault center on the question of the subject in his late oeuvre.4 The political spirituali-
ty of the revolutionary subjects was the origin of his philosophy of truth-telling, critique 
and care of the self. To substantiate his claim, Ghamari-Tabrizi offers us a historically 
grounded reading of Foucault’s late writings, highlighting and emphasizing the connec-
tions to his articles and interviews on Iran. Even if he doesn’t quite succeed to convince 
that the Iranian revolution was the context par excellence for the development of Fou-
cault’s thinking on the subject, he shows how the Iran-texts fit into his late concerns and 
work.  
                                                        
1 Cf. Janet Afary and Kevin B. Andersen, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of 
Islamism (2005). 
2 Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Hoy (1986), 51. 
3 Cf. e.g. Michiel Leezenberg, “Power and political spirituality: Michel Foucault on the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran,” in Michel Foucault and the Politics of Religious Experience, ed. James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette 
(1998); Bonnie Honig, “What Foucault Saw at the Revolution: On the Use and Abuse of Theology for Poli-
tics,” Political Theory 36:2 (2008), 301-312. 
4 Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” Critical Inquiry 26:4 (2000), 821-865. 
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Foucault in Iran is, however, not only a book about Foucault. It is also a thought-out 
rejection of what the author calls “Enlightenment rationalist fundamentalism” in ap-
proaching the Iranian revolution, Islamism, or more generally, any political event or 
phenomenon in the Middle East.5 Such fundamentalism, Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests, in-
sists on a binary divide between secular and Islamist politics and subjects the present 
moment to historical necessities, which precludes the possibility that something might 
be contingent or novel. The author stages his criticism of this approach mainly through a 
systematic attack on the only book which had been devoted to Foucault’s texts on Iran 
prior to the publication of his own, namely Janet Afary’s and Kevin B. Anderson’s 2005 
Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seduction of Islam. In the process, Gha-
mari-Tabrizi also manages to renegotiate the memories, popular narratives, discursive 
framings and historiographies of the Iranian revolution, because in the end “how one 
assesses Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution depends on the narrative through 
which one tells the story of the revolution and its outcome.”6  
In their book, Afary and Anderson suggested that (what they read as) Foucault’s “un-
critical embrace of the Iranian ayatollahs” should not be seen as an isolated mistake or as 
something caused by his limited knowledge of Iranian history, society and politics.7 In-
stead, they argue that his Iran-texts are best explained by the preference for an idealized 
premodern past (including traditional gender roles) and the fascination for pain, death 
and “limit experiences” that they, through a mix of insinuation and contiguity, attribute 
to him.8 Enthralled with exotic Shi’i rituals, Foucault failed to notice that the revolution-
ary movement had liberal and leftist factions too. His disdain for enlightenment values 
and modernity made him sympathetic towards the Islamists of the movement, disre-
garding that they had authoritarian and violent inclinations and targeted religious and 
ethnic minorities and women. The moral of the story that Afary and Anderson tell is 
that refusal to commit to transcendental and universal norms will lead to absurd politi-
cal positions and alliances.  
Ghamari-Tabrizi objects that Afary and Andersen write as if it was already clear dur-
ing the fall of 1978 was clear that the revolutionary mass-movement would result in the 
authoritarian and violent regime that by the early 1980s had consolidated its grip on the 
country. For them, as for many others, secularism and progressiveness go together and 
radical Islamism can only lead to the terror and repression that indeed did follow the 
Iranian revolution. Ghamari-Tabrizi highlights that Foucault, in contrast, approached 
the revolution as a singularity and a novelty, the outcome of which would neither be 
given by already recognized patterns of revolutionary change (whether of the liberal or 
Marxist type) nor by religious scripts. Foucault’s point of view will, however, appear 
incomprehensible if we don’t realize that the Islam of the revolutionary movement was 
something different from the Islam that came to be institutionalized by the post-
                                                        
5 Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution and the Enlightenment (2016), 15.  
6 Ibid., 160.   
7 Ibid., 9.  
8 Ibid., 34.  
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revolutionary regime. The former was, on the one hand, a feature of the popular cultural 
legacy, which offered a shared, but vague and ambiguous, idiom of social justice to the 
heterogeneous forces frustrated by the Pahlavi-regime and allowed “massive numbers 
of peoples” to identify with the anti-Shah movement. The Shi’ism of the movement was, 
on the other hand, a form of liberation theology, as developed by Ali Shari’ati, who, 
drawing on existentialism, socialism, and Third-Worldism, reinterpreted Shi’ism as a 
permanent struggle against oppression. Foucault treated these Islams, which did not 
carry a blueprint for the future, as a source of creative possibilities. It was only after the 
revolution, Ghamari-Tabrizi underscores, that a group of Khomeini’s hardline support-
ers substituted these indeterminate Islams of negation with an affirmative, prescriptive, 
juridical and doctrinal Islam, which was to serve as the foundation of the state. 
Defending Foucault’s depiction of the revolutionary movement as Islamic and as uni-
fied, Ghamari-Tabrizi argues that the plurality of forces taking part in the revolution 
were nonetheless one movement because they were brought together by Shi’ite tradi-
tions, discourses and rituals and by the leadership of Khomeini. Revisiting the Iranian 
oppositional culture of the 1960s and 1970s, he highlights that this was a time and a 
place in which the secular/religious divide was not politically decisive. During the 
fall/winter of 1978-79, the Iranian liberal and leftist organizations never defined their 
objectives in purely secular terms and that they endorsed Khomeini’s leadership based 
on their common anti-shah and anti-imperialist positions, but also because no political 
group could at the time join the rising revolutionary movement without doing so. The 
period of symbolic appropriation of Islam by a diverse spectrum of political parties and 
social groups came to an end after the victory of the revolution, when different political 
groups clashed over what form the post-revolutionary order should take. The unifying 
role of Islam during the revolutionary process itself has later been distorted not only by 
outside observers who presuppose a “natural” secular/religious divide in politics, but 
also by the two sides of the post-revolutionary power struggle: both the winning side, 
which came to dominate the state institutions, and the losing side, which was subjected 
to mass-executions and mass-imprisonments in the name of Islam, came in retrospect to 
present the theocracy that was established as the inevitable outcome of an Islamic revo-
lution.  
Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests in addition that the post-revolutionary violence and re-
pression that came to pass was not part of the self-evident agenda of the Islamists who 
took hold of state power, and was therefore not foreseeable to all but those allegedly 
blinded by Shi’ite exoticism. The terror was instead the response of the politically inex-
perienced religious establishment to a specific set of post-revolutionary challenges. They 
resorted to an extensive use of the newly conquered repressive apparatus of the state 
when confronted with a number of serious threats to their new power position: strong 
political rivals with opposing agendas, labor riots encouraged and assisted by the Marx-
ists, radical, and perhaps unrealizable, social demands made by the lowest strata of soci-
ety, and discontent and unrest in areas dominated by ethnic minorities (most important-
ly in Kurdistan). In addition, Ghamari-Tabrizi highlights the use and promotion of vio-
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lence by the militant Islamomarxist and Marxist opposition groups as one of the factors 
leading up to the terror unleashed by the Islamic Republic.  
Ghamari-Tabrizi’s willingness and careful effort to do justice to the winning side of 
the postrevolutionary power struggle (without in any way excusing the indiscriminate 
violence unleashed towards members and sympathizers of opposition groups) will ap-
pear striking for those who have read his prison memoirs Remembering Akbar: Inside the 
Iranian Revolution (2016), which was published about the same time as Foucault in Iran. In 
that book we meet the author as a young committed Marxist-Leninist student partaking 
in the revolution and later suffering through “the realpolitik of the postrevolutionary 
state” in the form of torture and several years of imprisonment in deplorable condi-
tions.9 Ghamari-Tabrizi states early on in Foucault in Iran that he will not write the book 
from the perspective of a participant but instead re-situate his experiences in a wider 
context, re-evaluate the historical significance he previously attributed to his revolution-
ary milieu, and try to meaningfully navigate “the volatile terrains of memory, myth, 
ideology, and history.”10 The book still benefits from its author being an insider of the 
revolution, among other things because he is able to include details from the Iranian 
oppositional culture of the 1960s and 1970s, making his narrative come alive (the de-
fense speech of a Marxist poet about to be executed emphasizing the proximity of Islam 
and Socialism, the open letter of a leftist anti-imperialist female author in March 1979 
urging women not to fail the revolution by focusing on women’s issues, ...).  
Foucault in Iran privileges the defense of Foucault’s anti-teleological approach to the 
revolution over a critical engagement with his account, but the latter is not missing 
completely. Ghamari-Tabrizi highlights that Foucault wrote on Iran, like Fanon on Alge-
ria, from a position of sympathy and solidarity with a movement in a country about 
which he had limited knowledge and the language of which he did not speak. He, like 
Fanon, also underestimated the way in which the weight of the past would burden the 
present and failed to notice how the very revolutionary energy he was witnessing could 
“revert into fueling a repressive state machine.”11 Echoing a point previously made by 
Leezenberg,12 he also suggests that Foucault was disposed to neglect the “deeply rooted 
networks and ethos of legalistic and doctrinal Islam that would eventually dominate the 
post-revolutionary state politics” because what he actually had read about Islam and 
Shi’ism had been focused on the minor traditions of mysticism and Sufism.13 To some 
extent, a similar problem appears in Foucault in Iran itself. The book doesn’t devote 
much space to discussing the place and role of legalistic and doctrinal Shi’ism in the 
revolutionary movement, which makes it difficult to understand how that form of Islam 
came to ascendancy after the revolution. One of the effects of this marginalization is the 
easiness with which Ghamari-Tabrizi can disregard the fears of a “Westernized” Iranian 
woman, a certain Atoussa H., with whom Foucault had a brief exchange in November 
                                                        
9 Behrooz Ghamari, , Remembering Akbar: Inside the Iranian Revolution (2016), 189. 
10 Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran, xi. 
11 Ibid. 73. 
12 Leezenberg, “Power and political spirituality”.  
13 Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran, 73-74. 
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1978, about what an Islamic government might entail for her, and instead, just like Fou-
cault had done before him, focus solely on the Orientalist assumptions appearing in her 
text. This critique should, however, not distract from the fact that Foucault in Iran is a 
bold and original work, which destabilizes prevalent assumptions about the 1979-
revolution and Foucault’s interpretation of it by offering a concrete, contextually based, 
and historically specific analysis. On top of this, the book is also beautifully narrated, 
showing the author’s talent for telling stories and writing. 
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